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Comments
Attachment In California: Senate Bill 1048,
The Interim Response To Randone
In 1971, California's long-standing prejudgment attachment pro-
cedures were held unconstitutional. The basis of this decision
was that these remedies denied the debtor procedural due process
by failing to provide him with notice of the attachment or an op-
portunity to contest it. The California Supreme Court also made it
clear that the fact that attachment remedies reached necessities of
life-without a hearing on the validity of the creditors claim-
was an additional ground for holding it unconstitutional. The Leg-
islature responded to the court's criticisms by enacting a revised
attachment procedure. This comment analyzes the court's opinion
and tests the constitutionality of the new legislation. The author
concludes that these procedures may suffer certain constitutional
infirmities.
In 1971 the Supreme Court of California in Randone v. Appellate
Department' held that the California prejudgment levy of attachment
procedure under subdivision 1 of Section 537 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure-which permitted the initial attachment of a debtor's property
without affording him either notice of the attachment or a prior hear-
ing-violated procedural due process as guaranteed by the California
and United States Constitutions. In 1972 the California Legislature
enacted a new attachment bill designed to fill the void created by the
Randone decision. 2  These new statutes will expire on December 31,
1975.s This comment will briefly explain the prejudgment attachment
procedure prior to 1972 and indicate why they were held unconstitu-
1. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
2. S.B. 1048, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550. The new law becomes effective March 7,
1973. It adds the following sections to the Code of Civil Procedure: 537, 537.1,
537.2, 537.3, 538, 538.1 to 538.5, 541, 542.1 to 542.4, 542b, and 542c. It amends Sec-
tion 537.5 and 539 and repeals former Sections 537, 538, 541, and 542b.
3. S.B. 1048, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §27. This legislation is given a termi-
nation date because the California Law Revision Commission is conducting a study to
provide a more fundamental and thorough revision of the entire area of prejudgment
attachment.
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tional in Randone.4 Next an analysis of the new legislation will be
provided, including indications of changes in the prior law and prob-
lem areas in interpretation and application. Finally, the new legisla-
tion will be examined to determine if the constitutional requirements
mandated by Randone have been satisfied.
Attachment Procedure Prior to Randone
Under prior California law, attachment was generally allowed in
suits based on unsecured contracts, express or implied, for the direct
payment of money.5 If the defendant was a nonresident, or one who
had departed from the state, or had concealed himself, or could not
be found within the state the requirement that the contract be unse-
cured was dropped.' The remedy was also available against nonresi-
dents in a suit for money damages arising from injury to person or
property as a consequence of negligence, fraud, or other wrongful act.'
To obtain the writ of attachment the plaintiff had to file an affidavit
with the clerk of the court where the action was pending showing that
his cause of action came within those enumerated in Code of Civil
Procedure Section 537.1 If the contract was both made and payable
outside the state, the minimum amount claimed had to be $5,000.1
In all other cases the minimum claim had to be at least $200.10
The plaintiff was also required to file an undertaking" for one-half
the amount of damages claimed but not less than $50.12 The purpose
of the undertaking was to reimburse the defendant for damages sus-
tained by the attachment if the attachment was improperly issued or
4. For a detailed view of Randone see Jackson, Attachment In California-What
Now?, 3 PAC. L.J. 1 (1972).
5. Former CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §537(l), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970,
c. 1523, §2, at 3058, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550. §1. Also under former
Section 537(4) attachment was authorized in unlawful detainer; under former Section
537(5) it was authorized in an action by the state for the collectioft of taxes; and
under former Section 537(6) in an action by the state to recover funds paid by
police officers in the process of a narcotics investigation.
6. Former CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §537(2), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1523,
§2, at 3058, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972 c. 550, §1.
7. Former CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537(3), enacted CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1523,
§2, at 3058, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §1.
8. Former CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §538, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1523,
§2.7, at 3060, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §7.
9. Former CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537(1)(b), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c.
1523, §2, at 3058, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §1.
10. Former CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §538(4), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1523,
§2.7, at 3060, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972 c. 550, §7.
11. An undertaking is simply a promise or guarantee to pay a sum of money upon
the happening of a certain event. Generally, in an attachment action a plaintiff is
required to file an undertaking of two or more sufficient sureties. (CAL. CODE Crv.
PRoc. §1057). One corporate surety would also be sufficient (CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§1056), or, in lieu of sureties, a cash deposit. (CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1054a).
12. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §539, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 292, §2, at 1475,
amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §14.
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the plaintiff was unsuccessful in his suit.' 3 Once the clerk of the court
received the affidavit, and the undertaking was filed, the writ of at-
tachment was issued. The writ was directed to the sheriff of the county
in which the defendant's property was located and required him to at-
tach and keep a sufficient amount of the defendant's property to satisfy
the plaintiff's claim. 14  The property seized was held in custody by the
sheriff. The defendant was denied all right to use the property, but
did, however, retain title and could sell or assign the property subject
to the attachment. 15
Issuance of the writ of attachment by the clerk was a ministerial act
and no judicial officer reviewed the affidavit.' 6 The attachment could
be issued without notice to the debtor if so requested by the plaintiff in
writing at the time the complaint was filed.' 7 The debtor, however,
could at any time, even before the attachment was actually levied, ap-
ply to the court in which the action was brought to have the attachment
discharged if improperly or irregularly issued.' The question of
whether the attachment was improperly or irregularly issued was lim-
ited to whether there had been compliance with the specific conditions
of Section 537 and the court did not concern itself with the validity of
the plaintiff's claim.19 There was no hearing or other opportunity pro-
vided for the debtor to contest the validity of the plaintiff's claim prior
to the attachment.20 If the writ of attachment was improperly or ir-
regularly issued, as, for example, when the action was not in contract
or when the debt was secured, 21 the defendant could get the attach-
13. id.
14. CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. §540.
15. See 5 CAL. JuR. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment §136 (1967).
16. U.S. Overseas Airlines v. Alameda County, 235 Cal. App. 2d 348, 352, 45
Cal. Rptr. 337, 340 (1965).
17. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §537.5, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 1073, §1, at 3133,
amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §6.
18. CAL. CoDE Cirv. PRoc. §556.
19. Minorv. Minor, 175 Cal. App. 2d 277, 345 P.2d 954 (1959).
20. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
21. For a secured debt prior to 1971, a creditor could have invoked the provi-
sional remedy of claim and delivery. In 1971, the California Supreme Court held the
claim and delivery procedure unconstitutional in Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486
P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, on the grounds that (1) it violated procedural due proc-
ess by allowing a taking of property without prior notice or opportunity to be heard,
and (2) the official intrusions authorized were unreasonable searches and seizures un-
less made with probable cause (referring to both probable cause to believe that plain-
tiffs claim to the property is valid and that the property to be seized was in a cer-
tain place). In response to the Blair decision, the 1972 California Legislature re-
pealed the procedures held invalid and enacted a modified claim and delivery rem-
edy. (CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 855). These new provisions went into effect immediately
as Code of Civil Procedure Sections 509-521. These new statutes, like the new at-
tachment statutes are operative only until December 31, 1975 (§521, see also note 3
supra.) Under the new procedure the plaintiff, at any time after the commencement
of an action to recover possession of personal property (§509), may make a showing
to the court either by verified complaint or affidavit of his entitlement to the possession
of such property. [§510(a)]. If the court is satisfied that a valid claini exists it
issues to the defendant an order to show cause why the property should not be taken
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ment discharged upon application to the court.2"
The defendant could also get his property released from the attach-
ment if he filed an undertaking of at least two sufficient sureties, which
had to first be approved by the judge of the court issuing the writ.23
Also, by filing such an undertaking the defendant could have prevented
the attachment altogether, but since a plaintiff usually requested that
the writ issue without notice pursuant to Section 537.5 there was little
opportunity for a defendant to file the undertaking prior to attach-
ment. 24
Initially, any property of the debtor except wages could be at-
tached .2  The law did provide that various types of property were ex-
empt from attachment,2 6 but an exemption could only be claimed after
levy on the property had occurred. 7 If judgment in the action was
awarded to the plaintiff, the property attached could be sold to satisfy
the judgment.28
The Randone Decision
In Randone v. Appellate Department2 9 the California Supreme
Court struck down as unconstitutional on its face Code of Civil Pro-
cedure Section 537(1). The court examined the operation of Calif-
ornia's attachment procedure, and sharply criticized its integrity and in-
adequacy. The court pointed out that the procedure was not limited in
from him and given to the plaintiff. [§510(b)]. The judge may also issue a tem-
porary restraining order if it appears necessary for the preservation of the rights of the
parties and the status of the property. [§510(d)]. The order to show cause sets the
date, time, and place for the hearing and the defendant is also informed that he can
prevent the delivery of the property to the plaintiff by filing an undertaking. [§510(b)].
If at the hearing the court determines that the plaintiff is entitled to the property pend-
ing final adjudication, a writ of possession is issued [§510(e)] directing the sheriff
to seize the property in question. (§512). No writ of possession to enter the private
premises of any person may be issued without a prior judicial determination that there
is probable cause to believe the property is located there. [§511(a)]. The former
provision allowing the defendant to have the property redelivered if he posts an under-
taking is also retained in the new law. (§514). The statute also provides that if the
court is satisfied that the plaintiff is entitled to possession, a writ of possession may
issue without notice or a hearing if probable cause appears that: (1) The defendant
gained possession of the property by theft; (2) The property consists of negotiable
instruments or credit cards; or (3) The property is perishable, or is in immediate dan-
ger of destruction, serious harm, concealment, removal from the state, or to sale to an
innocent purchaser. [§510(c)]. The new law further provides that the court may
issue ex parte temporary restraining orders in lieu of the ex parte writ of possession
under the circumstances described in §510(c) discussed above. [§510(d)]. For
further analysis of new claim and delivery legislation, see REVIEW OF SELECTED 1972
CALIFORNMA LEGISLATION, this Vol. at 281.
22. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §558.
23. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §§554, 555.
24. CAL. COD CIrv. PRoc. §540.
25. Former CAL. CODE CrV. PROC. §537, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1523, §2,
at 3058, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §1.
26. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§690-690.29.
27. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §690.50(a).
28. Former CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §541, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1851, c. 5, §124,
at 69, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §15.
29. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
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its operation to specific categories of property, but allowed the creditor
to select whichever assets of the defendant he pleased. 0 A creditor could
thereby exercise his choice so as to place the debtor under severe depri-
vation to gain leverage to compel a settlement.31 The court also noted
that the creditor did not have to prove or even allege any special cir-
cumstances showing the need for an immediate attachment. 2 The at-
tachment was automatically issued without review of the affidavit by a
judicial officer. Neither was notice of the attachment nor opportunity
to contest the attachment afforded to the debtor. 3  The court further
indicated that the exemption statutes did not relieve the hardship of
attachment because the debtor could be forced to wait as long as 25
days before obtaining the release of his property. 4
The court then turned to the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 5 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a Wisconsin prejudgment wage garnish-
ment statute on the grounds that it violated a debtor's right to pro-
cedural due process by allowing the taking of his property without af-
fording him prior notice and hearing. The California Supreme Court
stated that the constitutional principles underlying Sniadach were not
limited to wage garnishments. In so holding, the court cited Blair v.
Pitchess,3 6 where it had previously construed the Sniadach rationale to
apply to California's claim and delivery law.3r The court also cited
two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court subsequent to
Sniadach which held that the due process requirements of Sniadach ex-
tended to any situation in which a defendant was subjected by force of
law to a deprivation of any significant property interest.33
In the Randone opinion, the California court concluded that the
balancing test of due process which was used in Goldberg v. Kelly30
also applied in the context of prejudgment attachments. To determine
if due process has been satisfied the court will balance the harm to the
individual against the interest of the state or creditor:
[T]he greater the deprivation an individual will suffer by the
attachment of property, the greater the public urgency must be to
30. 5 Cal. 3d at 544, 488 P.2d at 17, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
31. 5 Cal. 3d at 561, 488 P.2d at 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
32. 5 Cal. 3d at 544, 488 P.2d at 17, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
33. Id.
34. 5 Cal. 3d at 546, 488 P.2d at 19, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
35. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
36. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
37. See note 21 supra.
38. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
39. 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970). The Goldberg case held that the extent to
which due process must be afforded a welfare recipient before termination of benefits
is influenced by the amount of loss and depends upon whether the recipient's inter-
est in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.
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justify the imposition of that loss on an individual before notice
and a hearing, and the more substantial the procedural safeguards
that must be afforded when such notice and hearing are required.
40
Relying on this balancing test, the Sniadach decision, and the re-
cent line of cases41 subsequent to Sniadach, the court in Randone ar-
rived at two constitutional principles, each of which formed an inde-
pendent basis for its holding:
(1) No one can be deprived of any significant property interest
without notice and an opportunity to be heard except in extraordinary
circumstances;
42
(2) No one may ever be deprived of necessities of life before a hear-
ing on the validity of the creditor's claim even in extraordinary circum-
stances.
43
Applying these constitutional principles the court found Section
537(1) deficient on both grounds. The court held that the attachment
procedure deprived the owner of a significant property interest-the
use of his property- 4 4even though he retained title while the attach-
ment was in effect. The court concluded that Section 537(1) was un-
constitutional because this taking, without notice and hearing, was
sweepingly overbroad and not confined to extraordinary situations:
In sum, the instant attachment provision authorizes the de-
privation of a debtor's property without prior notice or hearing; it
has not been narrowly drawn to confine such deprivation to those
"extraordinary circumstances" in which a state or creditor interest
of overriding significance might justify summary procedures. As
such, we find that section 537, subdivision 1, constitutes a denial
of procedural due process and violates . . . the California . . .
and the United States Constitution[s].Y
The court also made0 it clear that the fact that Section 537(1)
reached necessities of life was an additional ground for holding it un-
constitutional:
40. 5 Cal. 3d at 558, 488 P.2d at 28, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
41. Klin v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); Cline v. Credit Bureau of Santa
Clara Valley, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970); McCallop v.
Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970).
42. 5 Cal. 3d at 541, 488 P.2d at 15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
43. 5 Cal. 3d at 562, 488 P.2d at 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. 726. The court made it
clear that it meant the actual as opposed to the probable validity of the creditor's
claim. (Id. at 563, 488 P.2d at 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 726). The court, therefore, by
requiring a hearing on the validity of the debt appears to have judicially exempted all
necessities from prejudgment attachment.
44. Prior cases had reasoned that prejudgment remedies did not amount to a
"taking" of property since the attachment or garnishment was only a temporary meas-
ure. See McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 116, 141 A. 699, 702 (1928), aff'd per
curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
45. 5 Cal. 3d at 557, 488 P.2d at 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
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The presently broadly phrased attachment provision covers an
enormous variety of property. . sweeping widely to permit pre-
judgment attachment of non-necessities and necessities alike. This
overbreadth constitutes a further constitutional deficiency.
46
Senate Bill 1048: The Interim Response to Randone
The main purpose of Senate Bill 1048 is to restore the attachment
remedy in commercial situations in which one business has furnished
goods on credit or loaned money to another business.47 The court in
considering the facts of Randone was concerned with the plight of the
"poor consumer" in rendering its decision and these commercial cases
were not considered.48 The court, however, held that it was necessary
to declare Section 537(1) unconstitutional in toto indicating that it
was not the responsibility of the court to revise the statute to save it
where it could be constitutionally applied.49
The Randone decision resulted in creditors of businesses having no
effective remedy to prevent the dissipation of assets or to collect their
debts.50 They could only wait until they received a judgment and
hope that there would be sufficient assets remaining to satisfy it. Sen-
ate Bill 1048 was introduced to provide an interim attachment remedy
for commercial creditors and modifies the former procedure in an at-
tempt to meet the specific objections in Randone.1
A. Actions In Which Attachment Is Available
The new legislation provides for prejudgment attachment against
corporations, partnerships, or individuals engaged in a trade or busi-
46. 5 Cal. 3d at 558, 488 P.2d at 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
47. See Memorandum in Support of S.B. 1048 by Harold Marsh, Jr., 1-4. (Mr.
Marsh provided the initial draft of S.B. 1048 which was introduced into the Legislature
by Senators Zenovich and Coombs).
48. Id. at 1.
49. 5 Cal. 3d at 562, 488 P.2d at 31-32, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
50. In responding to a questionnaire on attachment prepared by the California
Law Revision Commission, many attorneys and businessmen indicated that procedures
in lieu of attachment were generally unsatisfactory. Equitable relief such as a pre-
liminary injunction was said to be too costly, too time consuming, and too cumbersome.
It was also remarked that the courts sometimes favor a defendant too much under such
a procedure. Obtaining a receiver was also said to be expensive and too slow by
many of those who have used this procedure. Efforts to get summary judgment were
also found ineffective by many in that it was usually denied except in unusual circum-
stances, the standards of evidence and proof required were high, and it was easy for
the defendant to delay by a general denial or by raising issues which did not exist.
A confession of judgment was found useful by almost half of those having tried it.
The procedure was, however, almost as expensive as a suit, and others disliked using
this harsh remedy. It was also difficult to get the debtor to agree to a confession of
judgment, and if the confession of judgment was contained in an adhesion contract the
court many times would relieve the debtor. CALIFORNIA LAW REvISION COMMISSION,
Memorandum 72-69-Prejudgment Attachment (Review of Responses to Question-
naire).
51. Memorandum in Support of S.D. 1048, supra note 47 at 3.
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ness52 when the action is based on money loaned, a negotiable instru-
ment, the sale, lease, or licensed use of real or personal property, or for
services rendered. 53  Also, the requirement that the claim of the plain-
tiff be unsecured is continued from the prior law.
54
It is further required that the action be for a liquidated sum of
moneyI 5 and that the total sum claimed be at least $500, exclusive of
interest, attorney's fees and costs.56 Prior to 1972 the attachment was
authorized only if the amount of the claim was at least $200.51 There
was also no requirement that the action be for a liquidated sum under
prior law. The purpose of this change is to exclude attachment in
situations in which the defendant has a legitimate argument regarding
the extent of the obligation. 5
Attachment is also available if the defendant is a nonresident (in-
cluding any foreign corporation or partnership not qualified to do busi-
ness in the state), if the defendant cannot be found within the state
after the plaintiff has used due diligence to locate him, or if the de-
fendant conceals himself to avoid service of summons. 9 This is simi-
lar to former Code of Civil Procedure Sections 537(2) and 537(3),60
except that now foreign corporations and partnerships complying with
California corporation and partnership law are treated as domestic
corporations or partnerships.
As to the defendants specified in Section 537.2(d), nonresidents
etc., discussed above, the $500 minimum limit on the sum claimed
also applies, 6' but the amount claimed does not have to be a liquidated
sum of money, nor does the claim have to be unsecured.62 Also, the
action can be based on any type of claim for the recovery of money.63
Under former Sections 537(2) and 537(3) the action could be based
52. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§537.2(a)-(c), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §4.
53. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537.1(a), enacted, CAL STATS. 1972, c. 550, §3.
54. Id. See discussion of claim and delivery remedy for secured debts, note 21
supra.
55. Id. This section further provides that interest, attorney's fees, or costs
claimed by the plaintiff in addition to the principal amount of the debt shall not make
the claim unliquidated. (A liquidated sum of money is an amount fixed by agreement
of the parties, or by operation of law, or one which can be ascertained with reasonable
certainty). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
56. CAL. CoDE CIv. PRoc. §537.1, enacted, CAL. STArS. 1972, c. 550, §3.
57. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §538(4), repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §7.
Also, under prior law the minimum claim had to be $5000 if the contract was both
made and payable outside the state. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. §537(1) (b), repealed, CAL.
STATS. 1972, c. 550, §1.
58. Memorandum in Support of S.B. 1048, supra note 47 at 5.
59. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §537.2(d), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §4.
60. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
61. CAL. CODE C. PRoc. §537.1, enacted, 
CAL. STATS. 1972, . 550, §3.
2 . E Civ. PRoc. §537.1(a), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §3.
63. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537.1(b), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §3.
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on any contract or any action for damages based on negligence, fraud,
or other wrongful act.
B. Property Subject to Attachment and Levy Procedures
The new law provides that any of the following property that is not
otherwise exempt from execution64 may be attached: all property of
a corporation or partnership; 65 and all property of any defendant who
is either a nonresident, or one who cannot be found within the state, or
one who conceals himself to avoid service of summons.
66
With respect to individuals engaged in a trade or business, the writ
of attachment is limited to the following types of property (if not ex-
empt from execution): (1) inventory; (2) accounts, contract rights,
chattel paper, and general intangibles consisting of any right to the pay-
ment of money, except where the principal sum is less than $150 for
any individual claim; (3) bank and deposit accounts in excess of an
aggregate total of $1000; (4) securities; (5) equipment, other than a
motor vehicle or a boat required to be registered; and (6) real estate,
including any leasehold estate with an unexpired term of one year or
more. 67  It is further provided that an individual engaged in a trade or
business may apply at the hearing or any time thereafter to have the
court exclude from levy (or release) any of the above property found
necessary for the support of the defendant and his family."" Securities
are to be levied upon pursuant to Section 8101 et seq. of the Commer-
cial Code.69 Equipment is to be levied upon by filing a notice of lien
with the Secretary of State.70  The apparent purpose behind this
method of attaching equipment is to avoid depriving the defendant of
such equipment during the pendency of the lawsuit since there is not
the same degree of danger that equipment will be removed, concealed,
or simply dissipated as there is with respect to inventory, receivables,
64. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoC. §§690.1-690.29 list property exempt from execution.
65. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §537.3(a), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §5.
66. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537.3(c), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §5.
67. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §537.3(b), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §5. It
should be noted that Section 537.3 of the new law (which specifies the types of
property of an individual engaged in a trade or business that may be attached) also
provides that terms used in that subdivision which are defined in the Commercial Code
shall have the meanings therein specified. Commercial Code Section 9109(3) spe-
cifically provides that inventory and equipment does not include farm products.
Farm products are defined as crops, livestock, or supplies used in farming operations
and also as the products of such crops or livestock in their unmanufactured state.
Thus, if the defendant is an individual engaged in farming crops or raising livestock
much of his property will not be subject to attachment. Also, for individuals en-
gaged in a trade or business some negotiable instruments may not always be subject
to the levy of attachment since under Commercial Code Section 9106 "general in-
tangibles" does not include "instruments."
68. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537.3(b), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §16.
69. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §541, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §16.
70. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. &5,42.1, enacted, CAL. STATs. 1972, c. 550, §17.
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and bank accounts. The present method of levy on real property, per-
sonal property, bank accounts, commercial paper, and other credits is
retained.
7 1
C. Procedure For Obtaining A Writ Of Attachment
(1) Affidavit
To obtain the writ of attachment the plaintiff must file with the court
in which the action is pending an affidavit based upon the personal
knowledge of the persons subscribing thereto. The affidavit must
show: (1) that the action is one in which an attachment is authorized
under Sections 537 to 537.3 ;72 (2) that the indebtedness claimed is
due and presently owing; (3) that the attachment is not sought to de-
lay, hinder, or defraud other creditors of the defendant; and (4) that
the plaintiff has no information or belief that the defendant has filed
for bankruptcy or made a general assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors.73 There was no provision concerning a general assignment to
creditors under prior law.
(2) Undertaking
As under the former procedure, the plaintiff must file an undertak-
ing with two or more sureties to insure that if the defendant recovers
judgment the plaintiff will be able to pay all costs and damages.
74
The damages recoverable by the defendant include all damages proxi-
mately caused by the temporary restraining order or the levy of attach-
ment up to the amount of the undertaking. 7 The amount of the initial
undertaking is to be one-half of the principal amount of the plaintiff's
claim excluding attorney's fees.76 The limitation that the undertaking
71. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. §542(1) provides that real property shall be attached
by recording a copy of the writ in the county where the property is located. Per-
sonal property is attached by taking it into custody if capable of manual delivery,
§542(3). Credits and judgments owing to the defendant are levied upon by leaving a
copy of the writ with the persons owing such debts, and bank and other deposit ac-
counts are levied upon by leaving a copy of the writ with the bank manager, §542(5).
There are also provisions for utilizing a keeper when the assets of a going business are
attached, §542(3).
72. These sections specify the type of claim upon which an action may be based,
the minimum amount of the claim, the proper type of defendant, and the property
subject to attachment. Actions in which attachment is available are discussed in text
accompanying notes 52-63 supra.
73. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§538(a)-(d), enacted CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §8.
74. The defendant still may file an undertaking of one corporate surety or a
cash deposit in lieu of sureties. See note 13 supra.
75. The amount of the undertaking may now be increased to any amount neces-
sary to protect the defendant. (See text accompanying notes 80-81 infra.) Since the
defendant's recovery is limited to the amount of the undertaking it is important that he
make a motion to have the undertaking increased if he believes that it will be insuf-
ficient to cover his damages. It is, however, only the surety's liability which is limited
by the amount of the undertaking and not the plaintiff's. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§917.1, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 546, §1.
76. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §539(a), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §14.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 4
be not less than $5077 is removed. The court, however, must be satis-
fied that the defendant is adequately protected.
78
The defendant may object both to the character of the sureties and
the amount posted. If the defendant fails to object to the sureties
79
within five days after the levy of attachment he is deemed to have
waived all objection to them. The defendant may, however, object
to the dollar amount of the undertaking at any time before final judg-
ment is entered and there is no limit on the amount to which the under-
taking may be increased.80 Under prior law the amount of the under-
taking could not be increased to an amount that would exceed the
amount for which the writ had been issued. 81  The new law permits
the court to require an undertaking in whatever amount is necessary
to give full protection to the defendant should he prevail in the ac-
tion. In this regard it should be noted that the liability of any surety
furnishing a bond may be enforced without the necessity of an inde-
pendent action.8 2  The statute of limitations on a motion to enforce
liability on an undertaking is one year after the final judgment has
been entered in the action in which the undertaking was given and the
time for appeal has expired. 83
(3) The Temporary Restraining Order
Once the court is satisfied that the affidavit has established a prima
facie case, and the undertaking is filed, it shall issue, without prior
notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining order and notice of a
hearing. 84  The temporary restraining order restrains the defendant
from the following: (1) transferring, other than in the ordinary course
of business, any property in this state that is subject to the writ of at-
tachment; (2) issuing checks in excess of an aggregate of $1000 which
would reduce defendant's bank balances to less than the creditor's
claim; (3) opening new bank accounts; and (4) paying antecedent
debts.85
77. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. §539, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 292, §2 at 1475,
amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, § 14.
78. CAL. CODE Civ. PROc. §539(a), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §14.
79. The qualification of sureties are set out in CAL. CODE CIV. PRoC. §§1056,
1057.
80. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §539(a), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550,
§14.
81. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §539, enacted, CAL. STAT. 1967, c. 292, §2, at 1475,
amended, CAL. STAT. 1972, e. 550, §14.
82. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §539(b), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §14.
83. CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. §1058a, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 391, §2.
84. CAL. CODE Crv. tpoc. §538.1, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §9. It
should be noted that under this section banks do not have to observe the temporary
restraining order.
85. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §538.3, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §11.
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The defendant, however, is expressly permitted to meet any regular
payroll not exceeding $300 per week per employee; to make C.O.D.
payments for business goods; to pay taxes where a penalty will accrue
for delay; and to pay legal fees in connection with the attachment ac-
tion.8 6  The temporary restraining order expires 30 days after its ser-
vice upon the defendant unless it is earlier terminated by the issuance
of the writ of attachment, or by the defendant posting an undertaking
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 555, or by the court
vacating it upon an ex parte showing by the defendant that sufficient
property will be available to satisfy the creditor's claim .
7
(4) The Hearing
A hearing is set for seven business days after service of notice upon
the defendant or on the first regular date that law and motion matters
are heard thereafter, whichever occurs later.18 As pointed out in Ran-
done, prior law did not provide for a hearing. At least 24 hours before
the hearing each party is required to serve upon the other any affi-
davits he intends to introduce unless the court waives this requirement
upon a showing of good cause. Oral evidence may also be introduced
at the hearing by either party. 9
If the defendant does not appear in person or through counsel, the
court must issue the writ of attachment without further review. If
the defendant does appear at the hearing, the plaintiff must establish
the probable validity of his claim and that there is not a reasonable
probability that the defendant can assert a successful defense. Once
the court is satisfied of this, a writ of attachment shall immediately is-
sue. 0 It is further provided that the court may direct that other as-
sets of the defendant be levied upon if those to be attached exceed the
amount of the plaintiff's claim.91
D. Ex Parte Attachment
In the following situations the court may issue the writ of attach-
ment without notice of hearing afforded to the defendant: (1) When
a bulk sales notice has been recorded and published, or when an es-
crow has been opened regarding the defendant's sale of a liquor license;
86. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§538.3(a)-(d), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550,
§11.
87. CAL. CODE CxV. PROC. §538.3, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §11.
88. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §538.2, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §10.89. CAL. CODE Cxv. Paoc. §538.4, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, e. 550, §12.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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(2) When the plaintiff shows the court that there is a substantial dan-
ger that the defendant will transfer (other than in the ordinary course
of business), remove, or conceal the property; (3) When the notice of
hearing cannot be served within ten days after the use of reasonable
diligence and the court is satisfied that the defendant has departed
from the state or has concealed himself to avoid service; or, (4) When
the defendant is a nonresident (including unqualified corporations and
partnerships), or cannot be found within the state, or conceals himself
to avoid service.92
A defendant described in (4) above, who is not a corporation,
partnership, or individual engaged in a trade or business, may have
the attachment automatically lifted if he files a general appearance in
the action. Also, any defendant described in (4) above, even if a
corporation, partnership, or individual engaged in a trade or business,
may have the attachment discharged if the claim upon which the at-
tachment is based is not authorized under Section 537.1(a).9  This
appears to limit the use of the writ of attachment against such de-
fendants to the function of securing jurisdiction. A defendant whose
property is levied ex parte, but whose property would have been
subject to the writ of attachment under normal procedure cannot have
the attachment lifted by filing a general appearance. This defendant
may, however, request a hearing at any time upon notice to the plain-
tiff.
9 4
E. The Lien Of Attachment
The issuance of the notice of hearing and the temporary restraining
order creates a lien on all the debtor's personal property subject to the
levy of attachment. The lien, however, would be subordinate to the
claims of a bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or transferee in the
ordinary course of business. The lien terminates if the writ of attach-
ment is not issued within thirty days after the service of notice for
hearing, or if the defendant files for bankruptcy or makes a general as-
signment to creditors prior to the levy of the writ of attachment. 6
Once the levy of attachment takes place, 6 the lien which arose from
92. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§538.5(a)-(d), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550,
§13.
93. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §538.5(d), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §13.
Under §537.1(a) a claim may be based upon money loaned, a negotiable instrument,
the sale, lease, or licensed use of real or personal property or for services rendered.
94. Id.
95. CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. §542b, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §19.
96. For certain property, such as equipment, the levy of attachment actually takes
place by filing a notice with the Secretary of State. (CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §542.1,
enacted, CAL. STATs. 1972, c. 550, §17).
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the issuance of the temporary restraining order and notice of hearing is
perfected on the property attached, and becomes valid against any sub-
sequent bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer. When the writ of at-
tachment is issued ex parte a lien is created at that time and is valid
against all third persons.
97
Depending on the type of property attached, there are different pe-
riods for the duration of the lien, and also different procedures for ex-
tending the lien. A lien on equipment lasts for five years from the
date of filing unless previously terminated by disposition of the case.98
When more than four years and six months has elapsed after filing the
notice of the attachment lien, and there is no final judgment in the ac-
tion, the plaintiff may apply for an extension. If the extension is
granted, the effectiveness of the original lien is extended for another
five year period, and, if necessary, can be renewed again in the same
manner.
99
A lien of attachment on personal property (other than equipment)
expires after one year from the date of levy unless a notice of readiness
for trial is filed (or a judgment has been entered). The court may,
however, upon motion of the plaintiff made between ten and sixty days
before the expiration of the one year, extend the duration of the at-
tachment for an additional period or periods if satisfied that the delay
in trial is due to the fault of the defendant. 100 Under prior law the
duration of a lien of attachment on personal property was three years
and could be extended for one year periods, but not to exceed two
years. 10' A lien of attachment on real property is for three years.
The plaintiff may move to have the lien extended for a period of up to
two years, and the lien may be extended in this manner from time to
time if necessary. -0
Problem Areas
The new law purports to limit attachment to commercial situations
(except when Section 537.2(d) is involved).10 3 Yet, for an individ-
ual engaged in a trade or business, the law does not limit the type of
claim upon which the attachment action may be based to debts arising
97. CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. §542b, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §19.
98. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §542.2(c), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §17.1.
99. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §542.4, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §17.3.
100. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §542c, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §20.
101. Former CAL. CODE Civ. Noc. §542b, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1359, §1,
repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §18.
102. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §542a. The procedures for the length and extension
of the lien on real property are not part of the new legislation.
103. See Memorandum in Support of S.B. 1048, supra note 47. Included under
§537.2(d) are nonresidents, those who cannot be found within the state, and those
who conceal themselves to avoid service of summons.
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solely out of the business activities of such individual. His property, for
example, may be subject to attachment for a debt arising from
medical services furnished to him or for the purchase of a consumer
good such as a car. As an individual engaged in a trade or business
he is a proper defendant under Section 537.2(c) and an action based
on a claim for services rendered or the sale of personal property is
proper under Sections 537.1(a)(3) and 537.1(a)(4). The operation of
the new law in this manner leads to a situation in which an individual
in business for himself may have his property attached for a doctor
bill or other personal debt while the ordinary working individual is not
subject to attachment for the same type of debt. This seems discrimi-
natory against individuals engaged in a trade or business and may
raise an equal protection problem.
10 4
A similar inconsistency exists in that not only may an individual
engaged in a trade or business be subject to attachment for a nonbusi-
ness debt, but he may also have nonbusiness property attached. Al-
though the property of an individual engaged in a trade or business
subject to attachment is limited under Section 537.3(b)'0° to certain
assets, there is no requirement that these assets be used or held in con-
nection with the business. For example, securities personally held in-
eluding those acquired before the defendant entered the business could be
attached, or a personal bank account kept separate from the business
bank account, or personal debts owing to the defendant could also be
attached. Perhaps this is justified since unlimited liability is a disad-
vantage of doing business in this manner. Yet, the result still seems
inconsistent with the purpose of the bill by tending toward the possi-
bility of working a hardship on an individual which was sought to be
avoided by limiting attachment to commercial cases.
The new law additionally does not provide a definition of "indi-
viduals engaged in a trade or business." It may not, therefore, be
clear as to what facts are necessary to create the status of one engaged
in a trade or business. 0 Would this term include, for example, a
104. In areas of economic regulation a state is only required to show some
rational basis to sustain a classification that is discriminatory. See Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). It may, therefore, be difficult to find a violation of
the equal protection standards adhered to by the courts. The courts may also nar-
rowly construe the bill, in light of its main purpose, so that it does not apply to non-
business debts. This construction would also reflect the general policy of the courts
to uphold a statute as constitutionally valid whenever possible.
105. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
106. The words "trade" and "business" appear to have no definite legal meaning.
The terms are generally not restricted to commercial enterprises nor to an individual's
main occupation. For example, under Rev. & TAx. CODE §6013 the term business
includes any activity engaged in by any person with the object of gain, benefit, or
advantage, either direct or indirect. Under Rev. & Tax. Code §17020 the term "trade
or business" includes the performance of the functions of a public office. Under
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housewife making stuffed animals for sale at local flea markets? Could
the "Avon lady" have her accounts attached for a doctor bill? The
determination of whether or not a person is engaged in a trade or busi-
ness could be crucial; especially since a creditor may obtain a writ of
attachment for debts of a personal nature once it is established that
an individual is engaged in a trade or business.
Section 538.1 of the new law provides that "any bank" shall not
have to observe the terms of the temporary restraining order. The
term "any bank" is broad and it is uncertain whether savings and loan
associations would be included.
Code of Civil Procedure Section 540 (not part of the new legisla-
tion) provides that the value of the property attached must not exceed
the amount of the plaintiff's claim stated in his complaint. Due to
the possibility of a defendant having property which is exempt from
execution and property that is classified as a necessity free from at-
tachment a situation could arise in which the only item of property
available for attachment exceeds the amount claimed by the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff were to attach this piece of property which exceeded in
value the amount of his claim, the defendant could under Code of Civil
Procedure Section: 556 have his property released from the attach-
ment on the grounds that the writ was improperly issued. Case law
has established that when the writ issues for a greater amount than
stated in the affidavit, it is sufficient grounds to have the attachment
discharged as improperly issued.' 0 7  Further, an attachment greatly in
excess of the amount stated in the affidavit could subject the plaintiff
to an abuse of process action.'
Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 542 (not part of the new
legislation) the sheriff, constable, or marshall, upon receipt of written
instructions from the plaintiff, must proceed to levy the attachment
without delay. In Blair v. Pitchess'0 9 it was held unconstitutional for
Code of Civ. Proc. §1953e the term "business" includes every kind of business, pro-
fession, occupation, or calling whether carried on for profit or not. In fact one of the
reasons that Code of Civ. Proc. §388 was amended (CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1324, §1,
at 3150) was that the term "business" constituted little if any limitation on the right
to sue. This section had formerly provided that any persons transacting "business"
under a common name could be sued under that name. See CAL. LAw REv. COMM'N
comment, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §388 (West Supp. 1972).
107. Finch v. McVean, 6 Cal. App. 272, 275, 91 P. 1010, 1019 (1907); Baldwin v.
Napa & Sonoma Wine Co., 137 Cal. 646, 650, 70 P. 732, 734 (1902). See also 2
WrrgtN, C ALFoRNu PRocEDURE, Provisional Remedies §157 (2d ed. 1970).
108. White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 Cal. 2d 336, 438 P.2d 345, 66 Cal. Rptr.
647 (1968). There are presently no statutory remedies for wrongful attachment. The
common law remedies are malicious prosecution and abuse of process. For a more
detailed discussion see 2 WrnN, CALIFoNA PRocEDuRr, Provisional Remedies §214
(2d ed. 1970).
109. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971). See also discussion
in note 21 supra.
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a sheriff to intrude into private places without probable cause to be-
lieve that the property to be seized was at a specified location. Under
present procedure there is no requirement that the plaintiff produce
evidence of where the property sought to be attached is located. The
plaintiff in his instructions to the sheriff must only (a) describe the
property, and (b) if it is real property or growing crops, give the name
of the record owner of the land. 10 To prevent a reluctance on the
part of the sheriff to act in light of Blair, it would seem advisable that
a plaintiff now provide the sheriff with evidence of where the property
is located.
Are The Constitutional Requirements of Randone Satisfied?
A. The Requirement of Notice and Hearing
The new law does provide for a noticed hearing, thereby affording
the defendant a chance to contest the validity of the plaintiff's claim."'
Even in situations treated as extraordinary, where the writ of attach-
ment is issued ex parte, there are provisions allowing for the writ of
attachment to be discharged if the defendant complies with the require-
ment in Section 538.5(d)." 2  At the hearing the plaintiff must pro-
duce evidence to establish a reasonable probability that he will be suc-
cessful in his suit and the defendant may bring forth evidence of any
possible defenses he may have. These provisions appear to satisfy the
Randone requirement that adequate notice and opportunity to be
heard be given where the writ of attachment is not issued under extra-
ordinary circumstances.
Since, however, the deprivation of use was held to be a "taking" of
a significant property interest in Randone, doubt is cast upon the val-
idity of the issuance of the temporary restraining order under Section
538.1. A recent California case'" has held that a temporary restrain-
ing order could be granted without notice and a hearing only upon a
110. CONTINUNG EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFoRNIA DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE
§170 et seq. (1968).
111. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§538.1, 538.2, 538.4, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c.
550, §§9, 10, 12.
112. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §538.5(d), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §13.
Under this subdivision a defendant who is a nonresident, or who cannot be found
after due diligence, or who conceals himself to avoid service, but who is not a corpora-
tion, partnership or an individual engaged in a trade or business may cause the writ of
attachment to be discharged if he files a general appearance. A defendant who is a
corporation, partnership or individual engaged in business may cause the writ of at-
tachment to be discharged by filing a general appearance if the claim upon which the
attachment is based is not authorized under §537.1(a). This section allows an at-
tachment only when the claim is based on money loaned, a negotiable instrument, the
sale, lease, or licensed use of real or personal property or for services rendered. If
the type of claim is proper under §537.1(a) the defendant may request a hearing at
any time upon notice to the plaintiff.
113. Dickey v. Rosso, 23 Cal. App. 3d 493, 100 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1972).
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showing that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter could be heard on notice. The court stated that
these requirements satisfied the dictates of Randone.114 Section 538.1,
however, provides for the automatic issuance of the temporary restrain-
ing order without notice once the affidavit shows that the action is a
proper one for a writ of attachment. There is no requirement that the
plaintiff show such relief is necessary to avoid great or irreparable
harm. It might be argued, however, that the restraining order, due to
its limited scope under the provisions of Section 538.3, is of such de
minimus effect that due process is not violated.11 5 The court in Ran-
done stated:
[W]hat is due process depends on circumstances. It varies
with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation ....
Its contents is a function of many variables, including the nature
of the right affected .... "16
It would seem difficult for the court to find that the Legislature in-
tended that upon the affidavit establishing a prima facie case there
would be an automatic presumption of irreparable harm since the
facts in the affidavit only show that the action is proper for the attach-
ment and not that it is necessary in the particular case. Perhaps this
problem may be avoided if, in his affidavit, the plaintiff alleges circum-
stances showing that he would suffer irreparable harm if there was no
restraining order issued while the hearing is pending.
B. Ex Parte Attachment in Extraordinary Circumstances
Randone was clear on the fact that only in extraordinary circum-
stances could a person's property be attached without prior notice and
hearing. The four subdivisions of Section 538.5 of the new law permit
attachment without notice and a hearing when certain conditions are
present. Under subdivision (a) ex parte attachment is allowed when
a bulk sales notice has been recorded and published, or when an escrow
has been opened by the defendant with respect to the sale of a liquor
license. The property subject to the attachment is limited to the goods
covered by the bulk sales or to the creditor's pro rata share of the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the license. Under both of these narrowly con-
fined circumstances a creditor may be left without an effective remedy
against his debtor unless he can obtain an immediate writ of attach-
ment. For example, under a bulk sales transfer a creditor of the trans-
feror has no rights against the transferee personally or against the
114. 23 Cal. App. 3d at 499, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
115. See Jackson, Attachment In California-What Now?, 3 PAc. L.J. 1, 16 (1972).
116. 5 Cal. 3d at 558, 488 P.2d at 28, 96 CaL Rptr. at 724.
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property once the bulk sale is concluded in compliance with the notice
requirements, unless some other statute is violated such as where there
is a fraudulent conveyance. 117  Thus, if the debtor absconds with the
proceeds or there is only a small consideration paid the creditor may
be left with virtually nothing. It is common practice for an escrow to
be opened in connection with a bulk sale and upon notice of the sale,
creditors often erroneously assume that by filing their claims with the
escrow holder they are assuring themselves of at least pro rata payment.
But, unless the transferor has voluntarily given instructions in the es-
crow to pay creditor claims their filing can be ignored without legal
consequences.1 18 Also, the debtor-transferor could designate himself
as the escrow holder and could easily depart with the funds. Thus,
under these circumstances, if a debtor wished to treat his creditor un-
fairly, the only effective remedy the creditor has is to obtain a writ of
attachment. Where these facts are present it seems that the require-
ment of the extraordinary circumstance would be satisfied. This sub-
division still may be too broad, however, since there are many legiti-
mate bulk transfers and liquor license sales where the debtor has at-
tempted to provide satisfactory terms to pay outstanding claims. This
subdivision should not apply unless the plaintiff shows the court that
there are specific facts indicating the debtor may abscond and not
just that there is going to be a bulk sale or a liquor license sale.
Subdivision (b) permits attachment without notice or hearing when
the court finds that there is substantial danger that the defendant will
transfer (other than in the ordinary course of business), conceal, or
remove his assets. In Randone, the court stated that it would be con-
stitutionally valid
to permit attachment before notice in exceptional cases where, for
example, the creditor can additionally demonstrate before a mag-
istrate that an actual risk has arisen that assets will be concealed
or that the debtor will abscond.' 19
Subdivision (c) authorizes ex parte attachment when notice cannot
be served on the defendant with the use of reasonable diligence after
ten days, and the court is satisfied that the defendant has departed the
state or concealed himself. If the defendant cannot be found to be
served, the creditor has no remedy unless he can obtain a writ of at-
tachment ex parte. Since it is further required that the court must be
satisfied that the defendant has departed the state or concealed himself
117. CONTIUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL LAv vol. 1,
Bulk Transfers §15.
118. Id.
119. 5 Cal. 3d at 563, 488 P.2d at 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
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Randone appears to be satisfied. It should be noted that once the
defendant does appear he may request a hearing to contest the plain-
tiff's case.
120
Subdivision (d) allows ex parte attachment where the defendant is
a nonresident, or cannot be found within the state, or has concealed
himself. This subdivision is similar to former Code of Civil Procedure
Section 537(2)121 which was tested in several California cases 22 sub-
sequent to Randone and found constitutionally valid. Several federal
court cases123 have also upheld nonresidency as grounds for attachment
without notice or hearing.
C. Necessities Must Be Exempt From Attachment
According to Randone, necessities have to be automatically exempt
from any attachment procedure. The new law provides that all prop-
erty of corporations, partnerships, nonresidents, those who cannot be
found within the state, and those who conceal themselves may be at-
tached if not otherwise exempt from execution. 2 4  With respect to in-
dividuals engaged in a trade or business, only specified property not
otherwise exempt from execution may be attached. 2 5 These provi-
sions may be too broad to satisfy Randone.
Since corporations and partnerships do not have any exemptions
from execution under present law, 26 the new law may be deficient in
that it in essence assumes that corporations and partnerships do not
have necessities. Generally, a large corporation or partnership would
probably not have necessities within the meaning of Randone, but it
seems that a strong argument could be made that a one shareholder
corporation or a two-man partnership would have necessities. Ran-
done cited with approval a Minnesota Supreme Court case'1 7 that ob-
served that the attachment of the receipts of a small business would
often involve harsh deprivations comparable to those suffered by the
individual debtor:
120. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §538.5(d), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §13.
121. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
122. Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 100
Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972); Damazo v. MacIntyre, 26 Cal. App. 3d 18, 102 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1972). See also Banks v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 143, 102 Cal. Rptr. 590
(1972).
123. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing and Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Tucker
v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970).
124. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §§537.3(a), (c), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §5.
125. CAL. CODE CIrv. PRoc. §537.3(b), enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §5.
126. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE §15025(c).
127. Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d
87 (1970).
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The hardship and the injustice stressed . . . in Sniadach are
equally applicable to the laborer, artisan, or merchant whose live-
lihood depends on selling customers his services or his goods ....
No reason occurs to us why the corner grocer, the self-employed
mechanic, or the neighborhood shopkeeper should have his in-
come frozen by the garnishment of his accounts receivable prior to
the time his liability is established.128
Thus Randone recognizes that an individual in business does have
necessities and that if the assets necessary to keep his business running
and providing his income are attached, the businessman, like the con-
sumer, could be subjected to severe hardship by deprivation of his prop-
erty.
It is clear that a businessman may be caught in the same "easy credit
trap" into which the "poor consumer" can fall. Randone has recognized
this as applied to the individual in business for himself. There is no
reason to believe that an individual operating as a corporation, or two
individuals calling themselves a partnership are not also susceptible to
this same trap.
The Randone concern for the individual businessman was directed
to the possibility that he would be stripped of the means of carrying on
his business or the source of family support, before his liability is
clearly established. Persons operating their business as a partnership
or as a small corporation also derive their support from the business.
In this respect no distinction exists between those who are members of
a firm and those who are not. The same reason which exists for pro-
tecting an individual in business applies with equal force to each mem-
ber of a partnership or small corporation. It seems that the same
necessities which must be exempt for the individual engaged in a trade
or business should apply to corporations and partnerships which are
owned and operated by one or two individuals. Today, especially, this
should be true as there are many individuals operating as corporations,
usually advised to do so by an accountant or attorney for tax or other
considerations.
A second possible deficiency of the new bill is that under certain
circumstances the necessities of an individual engaged in a trade or
business may be attached. Although the new law provides that an in-
dividual engaged in a trade or business may exclude from the attach-
ment any item shown to be necessary for the support of his family by
claiming such exemption at the hearing or any time thereafter," '2 this
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may not be sufficient protection since if the defendant misses the hear-
ig the writ of attachment will automatically issue. Also the writ could
be issued ex parte if the defendant was a nonresident or could not be
found within the state or if the defendant could not be served by the
plaintiff within ten days. Thus a debtor may at times have his necessi-
ties attached before he has a chance to claim them. Randone clearly
stated:
[TIhe hardship imposed on a debtor by the attachment of
his 'necessities of life' is so severe that we do not believe that a
creditor's private interest is ever sufficient to permit the imposi-
tion of such deprivation before notice and a hearing on the valid-
ity of the creditor's claim. 130 [Emphasis added].
Conclusion
Although it is a significant improvement over the procedure criti-
cized and held unconstitutional in Randone, Senate Bill 1048 may fail
to meet the strict requirements set forth in Randone. The impact of
the temporary restraining order, automatically issued in every case
without the necessity of showing irreparable harm, may be a fatal de-
fect. A much more probable defect is that the bill fails to automati-
cally exempt necessities of life in certain situations and, perhaps er-
roneously, assumes that corporations and partnerships do not have
necessities. The bill also seems unfairly broad in allowing actions
against individuals engaged in a trade or business to be based on non-
business related debts.
Even if Senate Bill 1048 is found defective it should be commended
for some of the procedural safeguards it offers the defendant which
could provide the foundation for any attachment law that may follow.
The nature of the hearing, the method by which equipment may be at-
tached by filing notice of a lien instead of by seizure, the fact that the
defendant can now have the amount of the undertaking increased to
fully protect himself, and the procedures allowing a defendant to have
an ex parte attachment lifted by filing a general appearance in the ac-
tion, are all significant improvements in the law and should be con-
tinued in any subsequent attachment law.
John P. Stayner
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